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An experienced student of foreign affairs sum-
marizes world problems and conditions as he
sees and foresees them. 
CC ’ . > . > .&dquo; &dquo;.. ,:
IN NO country is public opinion so powerful as in the
United States,&dquo; English historian James Bryce wrote in 1888.
&dquo;The simple fact is,&dquo; Secretary of State Dean Rusk recently
said, &dquo;that the long-range foreign policy of the United States
is determined by the American people.&dquo;
If these statements are true, then our schools face a
formidable challenge in world affairs education. Nothing is
more important than for teachers to impart and for students
to develop the most enlightened and far-seeing views possible
in international relations. The broad perspective is essential.
Without an understanding of the main forces shaping our
world, the bits and pieces of current international events
make little sense. It is no exaggeration to say that the com-
petence of our future leadership and the wisdom of public
opinion in the years ahead rest on what is being taught and
learned in the schools today.
Basic to an understanding of global politics is an appre-
ciation of the unprecedented changes which have altered
our planet since the end of World War II. It is not only that
more nations and more powerful weapons exist. It is not
only that science has revolutionized our way of life or that
the industrialized regions of the world are enjoying a golden
age of prosperity. It is rather that the very framework in
which we need to think about world affairs is totally new.
4
For Americans, the most basic change of all has been the
swift emergence of this country as a world leader. Thomas ’
Jefferson, our first Secretary of State, managed the foreign
affairs of the nation with a handful of clerks and consular
officials. Prior to World War II, the State Department em-
ployed some 6,000 people. Now, more than 24,000 people
work for the State Department and thousands of others work
in closely affiliated agencies.
Once able to live in splendid isolation, the United States
has been thrust into total international involvement. As a
result, our foreign affairs have become intricate almost beyond
analysis. With troops in more than 30 countries, with com-
mitments to defend more than 40 countries, with foreign aid
having gone to more than 100 countries, little happens any-
where that does not affect our interests. Though we may
not have power enough to influence all events, we have too
much at stake to ignore any event. In coming years, the
extent of our involvement is likely to deepen.
No Country an Island 
’ ’ 
’
Rarely can a foreign policy problem be treated in isolation.
For instance, our Ambassador in country X may telegraph
Washington that, unless the United States votes a certain
way on a colonial issue in the UN, our relations with country
X will deteriorate. The State Department personnel directly
concerned with our relations to country X evaluate the in-
formation. But the Department’s Bureau of African Affairs
also receives a copy of the telegram because the colony in
question is in Africa. The Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, which deals with other regions sensitive
to colonial questions, may be called in. A copy of the tele-
gram may go to the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs, because the UN is concerned. The opinion of the
Bureau of Public Affairs is solicited, because the subject is a
sensitive one for an important sector of American public
opinion. The Defense Department must have its say, be-
cause the United States has military bases in country X.
Before taking any step, government officials must consider
how various possible actions might affect different U.S. in-
terests. Because we have many interests and they often con-
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flict, decisions are never easy. How much of one interest, for
example, can be sacrificed for the sake of another? Should
the United States risk alienating country X by voting against
it-or risk alienating newly independent nations by voting
with country X?
If the student is to grasp the nature of international affairs,
he must be attuned to their subtlety and complexity. The
recent development of East-West relations shows how com-
plex global diplomacy can be. For most of us the worldwide
political, economic, and ideological struggle against com-
munism has been an extraordinarily wearing battle. We are
used to fighting men, not ideas. We are prone to see issues
in black and white, not in the often muted tones of cold-war
gray. We are accustomed to reasonably quick solutions, not
to protracted conflict. As one author put it, &dquo;wars which are
not wars in the classical sense bedevil our minds and our
times.&dquo;
Communists take a different view of the cold war struggle.
As they see it, the fight to bury the Western world, whether
by peaceful or violent means, is a battle which may last for
generations. They are presumably prepared for the long
struggle, confident that victory will ultimately be theirs
because they are on history’s side. It has been debated
whether men in the Western world are equally capable of
adopting the long-range view and can muster the patience
and endurance necessary to sustain their ideals over the long
haul.
&dquo;A Balance of Terror&dquo;
These qualities are particularly pertinent now, when
East-West relations depend upon a continuing &dquo;balance of
terror.&dquo; With both superpowers having more than enough
nuclear weapons to annihilate the other, each must tread
gingerly to avoid triggering an escalation process that might
get out of control.
While the advance in military technology has given the
superpowers enormous strength, the balance of terror has
imposed a large degree of restraint upon their actions. The
United States dared not intervene during the 1956 anti- 
’
Soviet Hungarian revolution because Washington feared
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such a move might spark a global war. During the desperate
days of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, President Kennedy
pursued a policy of graduated pressures to show the Kremlin
that we meant business. He was also careful, however, to act
with enough flexibility to permit the Soviet Union to remove
its missiles without being backed into a corner from which
there might be no possible response except a nuclear strike.
Similarly, the Soviet Union has been careful not to risk a
direct confrontation with the United States in Vietnam. As
additional nations acquire nuclear capability, both risks and
the need for restraint in the conduct of foreign affairs will
grow.
&dquo; 
. Need for Accommodation
The restraint with which policy makers must operate has
an important bearing on our future relations with the Com-
munist countries. Total victory-meaning complete sub-
jugation of the enemy-is not a realistic possibility in the
present world context. Barring all-out nuclear war, which
would produce only losers, we-as well as the Communists-
must accept the fact that ours will continue to be a diverse
world. If history proves anything, it is that no one political
or economic philosophy can be universally applied. The
nuclear facts of life demand that there be some form of
accommodation between the contending forces, though there
may be wide disagreement on the terms of that accom-
modation.
The general aim of U.S. policy has been to search for means
of lessening tensions with the Soviet Union. In recent years,
the Kremlin has also shown signs of wanting to promote a
d6tente. The pursuit of accommodation will, in all proba-
bility, continue to be a major diplomatic activity-although
localized conflicts, such as the one in Vietnam, will certainly
make it more difficult to achieve further relaxation.
The need for caution and the search for a tolerable coex-
istence formula is not likely to find favor with those who
demand definitive answers to world problems, or who think
it treasonable to deal with Communists, or who believe that
communism would wither away if only the West took the
right actions. Nor does the search for coexistence meet with
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favor in some of the more die-hard Communist circles. But
is any course possible other than one which aims at an
acceptable accommodation? ...
No Place for Dogmatism
World affairs are simply too tangled for a dogmatic ap-
proach. For instance, while it was once possible to regard
the Communist bloc as a monolith, such a view plainly has
no place today. The Sino-Soviet rift has torn the Communist
world asunder. Yugoslavia has been an independent Com-
munist state since 1948. Rumania, in resisting Moscow’s
plans for the economic integration of Eastern Europe, and in
criticizing the presence of Russian troops in satellite nations,
has asserted its right to act independently. Throughout
Eastern Europe, the Communist nations are following their
national interests, which do not always coincide with those
of Moscow.
If present trends are any indication, the Communist na-
tions are likely to go their own political and economic ways
to an even greater degree in the future. Eastern Europe may
find itself increasingly drawn to the economic opportunities
offered by the West and could turn its back on Moscow. The
Sino-Soviet split would widen, thus making a U.S.-Soviet
d6tente all the more attractive to the Kremlin. At the same
time, the United States may be drawn more deeply into con-
flict with Communist forces in Asia.
The members of the Western alliance have also been tak-
ing off in different directions. When the alliance was formed
in the late 1940’s, the possibility of Soviet military aggression
against Western Europe was a distinct threat. Now that the
Soviet threat has receded, the need for alliance has lost its
urgency. In a sense, the alliance has been a victim of its own
success in carrying out its original aims. Today the allies are
able to agree on few important policy matters. The vision of
an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a
united Western Europe is fading. Economic talks aimed at
reducing tariffs and spurring trade between the United
States and Western Europe are going badly. NATO, the very
symbol of alliance, is in disarray. French President de Gaulle
seems determined to divorce his country from NATO and he
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wants U.S. troops out of France. He would also like to see
U.S. influence in European affairs curbed.
’. I.
End of Bipolarity 
’
The breakup of the bipolar world has been one of the
most dramatic manifestations of change in the 1960’s. The
period ahead may see the emergence of new alliance systems.
De Gaulle speaks of a Europe extending to the Urals-some-
thing he believes may be achieved when the Soviet Union
abandons its imperial designs and modifies its totalitarian
system. He sees advantages in a close French-Soviet link
which would provide a loose safety belt around Germany and
perhaps make German reunification possible on terms that
would satisfy all sides. If a satisfactory unification formula
cannot be achieved, however, West Germany may emerge
even more clearly as the principal U.S. ally in Europe.
Another possibility is that the drive toward European
economic and political unity will be reinvigorated and the
Common Market countries (France, West Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) will assume
major-power status in world affairs and perhaps even possess
their own nuclear force. Although Gaullist actions seem to
preclude such a development in the near future, the postwar
trend has been toward establishing regional institutions
geared to deal with supranational problems. The post-de
Gaulle period, therefore, may mark a new push toward con-
tinental unity.
The end of bipolarity marks the beginning of a time of
major change in the international lineup. This will impose
new strains on U.S. policy and demand sustained thinking
on a number of basic issues. How necessary is the Atlantic
alliance? If the alliance is an asset to the United States and
the West in general, what can Washington do to arrest NATO’S
decay? What policies should the United States pursue toward
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? If d6tente is a proper
goal, how can it best be realized? What policies should the
United States develop toward Southeast Asia and China?
Such questions will challenge the skills of our policy makers
for decades to come.
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The Underdeveloped World
Moreover, the problems we face during the balance of this
century will have to be considered in the context of con-
tinuing global upheaval. In the postwar period, dozens of
independent new nations have emerged from the ruins of the
former colonial empires. These new nations along with cer-
tain of the older established countries, mainly in Latin
America, are underdeveloped, predominantly agricultural,
and plagued by political and social instability. In Africa,
governments have been toppling like tenpins. In Asia, as
elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, the depth of poverty
is almost beyond imagination. In Latin America, explosive
tensions threaten to rip apart the fabric of order.
The underdeveloped nations face staggering difficulties in
their efforts to proceed along the development path. Despite
more than $50 billion in U.S. economic aid, despite billions
of aid dollars from other countries, despite enormous internal
efforts in some of the underdeveloped nations, the pace of
progress has been agonizingly slow. India, after 15 years of
labor, still has a per capita average annual income of less
than $100.
In our early enthusiasm for the foreign aid concept, many
of us may have underestimated the difficulties of economic
development. It is now more apparent that the struggle to
reach a self-sustaining level will last for generations and that,
if we are to help in that struggle, our aid will have to extend
for a similar period. Yet, as a percentage of gross national
product, the amount of aid we and the rest of the developed
world are extending is steadily diminishing.
Food and Famine
Never, however, has the need been greater. Only now are
we beginning to recognize the critical food and population ,.---
problems the underdeveloped countries face. Every day, some
10,000 people in the underdeveloped world die from malnu-
trition. Half the world’s people experience chronic hunger
and dietary deficiency. Of every 20 children bom in the
underdeveloped countries, 10 perish in infancy from illnesses
caused by improper diet. The nearly 500 million people
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of India subsist on an average caloric intake some 10 percent
less than minimum standards; and India was able to avert
famine in 1966 only because of large emergency grain ship-
ments from the United States and other countries.
If the underdeveloped countries cannot feed themselves
adequately now, what will they do at the end of this century,
when world population will have doubled its present 3.3
billion? Most of the increase will occur in the countries least
able to feed their present populations. &dquo;Either we take the
fullest measures both to raise productivity and to stabilize
population growth, or we face disaster of an unprecedented
magnitude,&dquo; the director general of the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization has said. President Johnson has
proposed that the U.S. &dquo;lead the world in a war against
hunger.&dquo; The U.S. aid program in general is now being
geared more closely to spurring agricultural development in
low-income nations as well as to supplying more food on
easy credit terms.
Many of the underdeveloped countries are making new
efforts to increase their own agricultural yields and are
tackling the other side of the equation-population control-
as well. The development of an intrauterine device has made
available a means of cheap, effective, and widely accepted
birth control. A number of countries have established a net-
work of birth control clinics and are making other birth
control services available to the people. The United States,
which until a few years ago refused to get involved in assist-
ing the birth control programs of foreign governments, has
made an about-face and is now offering technical aid to
countries which request help. The United Nations is doing
likewise. The crucial years in the struggle to control popula-
tion growth and increase agricultural yield lie immediately
ahead. It is certain, therefore, that population and food




In all the sound and fury of the postwar years, public
officials and private citizens from almost all countries have
sought order and progress through cooperative action in such
11 
institutions as the United Nations. While the UN has more
nearly mirrored the world’s ills than solved the world’s
problems, and while it has not been able to resolve great-
power disputes or been the cure-all which many had sought,
it has nevertheless performed a variety of valuable services.
It has served as a forum for debate and quiet diplomacy; it
has been a peacemaker in disputes involving small powers;
its peace forces have helped preserve order on several occa-
sions ; its specialized agencies have promoted social and
economic progress throughout the world. As the trend to-
wards cooperative action continues to develop, the UN’s role
in world affairs may grow larger.
The ideas and forces shaping the world of tomorrow cry out
for study and understanding. U.S. involvement in global
affairs, the breakup of the old alliances and the formation of
new ones, the risks added and the restraints imposed by
nuclear weapons, the attempt by low-income countries to
modernize and to solve their food and population problems,
and the quest for global order are realities which will be with
us for a long time to come. That these realities be thoroughly
understood by our teachers and clearly transmitted to our
students is one of the compelling needs of our day.
